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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2369 
_____________ 
 
ANDREA SESSOMS, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE TRUSTEES OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,  
doing business as  
THE UNIVERSITY OF  
PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH SYSTEM  
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-16-cv-02954 
District Judge: The Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2018 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 20, 2018)                              
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_____________________ 
 
  OPINION∗ 
_______________________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 Andrea Sessoms appeals the grant of summary judgment to her former 
employer, the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”), on her claims 
of discrimination, failure to accommodate disabilities, and retaliation.  She also 
appeals an order denying a motion for recusal.  Because the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment to Penn and did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
recuse, we will affirm. 
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I.1 
 Sessoms is an African-American woman who suffers from mental and 
physical disabilities.  She initially began work at Penn in October 2012 as a 
temporary employee, and Penn later hired her in summer 2013 as a Human 
Resources Information Systems Coordinator.  Maria Colavita, a Caucasian woman 
without disabilities, was her supervisor.  At Sessoms’s initial performance review 
in early 2014, Colavita rated Sessoms’s work satisfactory.   
 Not long after the initial review, Sessoms’s mother became gravely ill and 
eventually passed away.  Sessoms then took a period of bereavement leave.  
During her mother’s illness and after her return from leave, Colavita chastised 
Sessoms in front of other employees, raised her voice and rolled her eyes, did not 
listen to Sessoms’s explanations for errors, and generally behaved 
unsympathetically.  Sessoms did not perceive that Colavita treated her coworkers 
in a similar manner.   
 Sessoms began to experience physical symptoms such as memory loss and 
high blood pressure.  She acknowledges that the memory loss may have caused her 
to make mistakes at work.  When Sessoms informed Colavita about her physical 
symptoms, Colavita told her that her medical issues were irrelevant and she didn’t 
                                                 
1 This factual summary, which is consistent with the District Court’s discussion 
and is presented in the light most favorable to Sessoms, is taken largely from her 
brief and the record citations referenced therein. 
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care about them.   
 On several occasions, Sessoms expressed concerns to others about 
Colavita’s treatment of her, including the department’s director, Margaret Alford, 
and human resources employee Joann Crowley.  Sessoms felt Alford and Crowley 
were dismissive of her concerns.  Sessoms asked Crowley to mediate the situation 
with Colavita, but Crowley failed to do so.     
 On September 4, 2014, Colavita called Sessoms into her office for a private 
meeting.  During the meeting, Colavita used her own legs to spread Sessoms’s legs 
apart.  Sessoms, shocked, got up and walked out.  This was the only time Colavita 
ever touched Sessoms.   
 About two weeks later, on September 12, 2014, Colavita called Sessoms into 
a meeting with her and Alford to sign a “coaching record” reflecting criticisms of 
Sessoms’s performance and listing corrective actions for Sessoms to take.  
Agitated and upset after the meeting, Sessoms applied that same day for leave 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  Penn approved her FMLA 
request.      
 Sessoms remained on FMLA leave through December, then took additional 
medical leave through March 2015.  During the FMLA leave, Sessoms filed a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC.  Toward the end of a total of 24 weeks of 
medical leave, and on advice of a doctor, Sessoms requested in writing that Penn 
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accommodate her disabilities.  She asked to “begin at part-time hours to transition 
back to work, eventually return to full-time,” to change to a “different department, 
office, supervisor,” and to work in a “lower-stress department/office” with “[a] 
different supervisor—due to current litigation [the EEOC charge] and client’s 
allegations of misconduct toward current supervisor.”  JA 208–09.   
 On April 13, 2015, Alford, Crowley, and a third supervisor met with 
Sessoms to advise her of the accommodations Penn was willing to make.  Among 
other things, Penn offered a part-time schedule, but at the same job, i.e., still 
supervised by Colavita.  Sessoms did not consider these accommodations to be 
reasonable, preferring different part-time hours and another supervisor.  She 
therefore declined the accommodations.  Penn, in turn, terminated her employment 
on April 22, 2015.   
 Sessoms filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on November 7, 
2014.  The EEOC dismissed the charge, and Sessoms ultimately filed suit in the 
District Court.2  On May 24, 2017, the District Court granted summary judgment 
                                                 
2 In her amended complaint, Sessoms presented claims of unlawful discrimination 
on the basis of her gender, race, and disabilities in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213, and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 951–63.  She also claimed that Penn 
failed to accommodate her disability in violation of the ADA and PHRA, and 
unlawfully retaliated against her for filing a charge of discrimination in violation of 
Title VII and the PHRA. 
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to Penn on all claims.  Sessoms timely appealed. 
II.3 
 We review de novo the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Penn.  
Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate if Penn established that there is “no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact” and that it is therefore “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
See id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  As the non-moving party, the facts are 
viewed in the light most favorable to Sessoms, and all inferences are drawn in her 
favor.  See Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2017).   
A. 
 Sessoms contends Penn did not engage in a good faith effort to reasonably 
accommodate her disabilities.  To establish that an employer failed to participate in 
the interactive process of considering disability accommodations, the employee 
must demonstrate that (1) the employer knew of the disability; (2) the employee 
requested accommodations; (3) the employer did not make a good faith effort in 
identifying reasonable accommodations; and (4) the employee could have been 
reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.  Taylor v. 
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 319–20 (3d Cir. 1999).  An employer may 
demonstrate good faith in various ways, including meeting with the employee, 
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requesting information about the employee’s condition and limitations, asking 
what the employee wants, showing signs of having considered the employee’s 
request, and offering and discussing available alternatives when the request is too 
burdensome.  Id. at 317.  Where an employee requests an accommodation in the 
form of a transfer, she must make a showing that this accommodation is possible, 
i.e., the existence of an equivalent-level, vacant position for which the employee 
could qualify.  Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Reasonable accommodation does not entitle an employee to a supervisor ideally 
suited to her needs.  Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319 n.10.  Nor does the law require a court 
to set the conditions of employment.  Gaul, 134 F.3d at 581. 
 Penn demonstrated good faith in its negotiations with Sessoms.  It is 
undisputed that her supervisors met with her, considered her requests, and offered 
several accommodations, including a part-time work schedule.  JA 175.  To the 
extent Sessoms declined these proposals because she sought a transfer to another 
department or supervisor, Sessoms did not meet her burden of showing that other 
positions existed to which transfer was possible.  See Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580; see 
also Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2000).  In 
addition, while she argues that she requested altered supervisory methods, the 
record does not reflect that she ever made such a request, see JA 208–09, or that 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 
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altered supervisory methods could have accommodated her in any event.  Rather, it 
is apparent that Sessoms was unwilling to agree to any accommodation that 
included continued supervision by Colavita.  See JA 388 (“Basically . . . I would 
work if I was not assigned to Maria.”).  Under these circumstances, particularly in 
light of her failure to seek out other possible positions, her request to be supervised 
by someone other than Colavita was unreasonable.  See Gaul, 134 F.3d at 579–81.  
 In addition, Sessoms argues that Penn should have attempted to 
accommodate her disabilities sooner than it did.4  Sessoms contends that Penn 
should have proactively offered accommodations before she made a request for 
accommodations, and contends that she should be excused from making an earlier 
request because Colavita “actively discouraged” her from doing so.  Sessoms Br. 
25–26 (quoting United States v. City and County of Denver, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 
1241 (D. Colo. 1999)).   
 While an employee’s accommodation request need not be formal, be in 
writing, or invoke any particular “magic words,” our case law requires the 
employee or her representative to make the initial request in order to trigger an 
                                                                                                                                                             
1367.  This Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4 Sessoms proposes, for instance, that Crowley could have mediated her problems 
with Colavita, and that Sessoms’s supervisors could have altered Colavita’s level 
or methods of supervision.  Sessoms Br. 27.  Notably, Sessoms did not request 
these accommodations when she made her March 2015 written request, and there 
is no indication that Sessoms’s earlier request to Crowley for mediation should 
have been taken as a disability accommodation request. 
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employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process.  Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313.  
Penn thus was not obligated to engage in the interactive process before Sessoms 
made her first request for accommodations in March 2015.5  Accordingly, this 
claim lacks merit.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 Moreover, even if we were persuaded by City and County of Denver, an out-of-
Circuit District Court opinion, to put the onus on the employer to initiate the 
interactive process where the employee is “actively discouraged” from seeking 
accommodations (a step we do not, and need not, take in this case), we point out 
that Sessoms did not put forth evidence that she was “actively discouraged” from 
requesting accommodations.  Colavita’s statements that she did not care about 
Sessoms’s medical needs do not amount to actively discouraging Sessoms from 
pursuing her legal rights.  Indeed, Colavita’s comments notwithstanding, Sessoms 
did request accommodations in March 2015, and the record is devoid of evidence 
that Colavita’s statements deterred Sessoms from doing so sooner. 
 
10 
 
B. 
 Sessoms next claims that summary judgment was inappropriate as to her 
retaliation claim.  To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the employee must 
show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse 
action against her; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two.  Moore v. 
City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006).  If she makes out a prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse action; once it does, the burden returns to the 
employee to persuade the finder of fact that the employer’s action was mere 
pretext.  Id. at 342. 
 Sessoms engaged in protected activity by filing the charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC.  That occurred on November 7, 2014, while Sessoms was on 
FMLA leave.  She did not return to work before her April 22, 2015 termination.  It 
cannot reasonably be questioned that the termination was a materially adverse 
action.  See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Yet the passage of time between the EEOC charge and Sessoms’s 
termination is not an unusually suggestive temporal proximity.  Id. at 233 (three 
months, without more, is not unduly suggestive).  And, the record is devoid of 
additional evidence that could constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliation 
during that period.  See Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 
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2007).   
 Sessoms responds that her return from medical leave was Penn’s first 
opportunity to retaliate against her.  Even if we were to agree that Sessoms has 
made out a prima facie retaliation claim, she cannot prevail.  The record 
demonstrates that Penn had a legitimate reason for her termination: her decision to 
decline Penn’s proposed accommodations.  Because we have already concluded 
that Sessoms would have agreed to return only if Colavita was not supervising her, 
and thus would not have been satisfied by any reasonable accommodation offered, 
Sessoms fails to demonstrate that Penn’s decision to terminate her employment 
was not legitimate.  
 Sessoms also contends that a jury could find that the September 12, 2014 
meeting was retaliatory and that the “coaching record” was a materially adverse 
action taken in response to protected activity, namely, Sessoms’s complaints of 
mistreatment by Colavita.  Again, even if we were to accept that Sessoms made a 
prima facie retaliation claim in this regard, the record reflects that Penn had a 
legitimate reason for issuing the “coaching record.”  Sessoms admittedly made 
mistakes at work, which increased over the time she was supervised by Colavita.  
JA 398–99.  Because she made mistakes and she does not put forth evidence that 
the “coaching record” was false or inaccurate, Sessoms cannot establish that the 
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“coaching record” was mere pretext for retaliation.6 
C. 
 Next, Sessoms contends there is a triable issue on her hostile work 
environment claim based upon the September 4, 2014 “touching incident” with 
Colavita.  Before the District Court, Sessoms “all but concede[d]” that the incident 
was not sufficiently severe to create a gender-based hostile work environment.  JA 
23.  Now, Sessoms argues that “the physically humiliating and intentional leg 
contact here combined with inferences of needed submission constitutes severe or 
pervasive conduct” giving rise to a hostile work environment.  Sessoms Br. 35.   
 Even if Sessoms did not waive this claim by “all but conced[ing]” it before 
the District Court, JA 23, we conclude that, considering the circumstances, this 
isolated incident was not “severe or pervasive conduct.”  Sessoms correctly 
observes our holding in Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264–65 (3d Cir. 
2017), that a complaint in which a plaintiff pleads an isolated incident of 
harassment may give rise to a hostile environment claim sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss if the particular circumstances show that the incident is so 
                                                 
6 Sessoms also posits, for the first time on appeal, that Colavita retaliated against 
her during the September 4, 2014 meeting by inappropriately touching her legs.  
Sessoms argues that she raised issues about discrimination and her health problems 
prior to that meeting, and that Colavita’s inappropriate touching during the meeting 
“is materially adverse as an action that is reasonably likely to deter protected 
activity.”  Sessoms Br. 29.  This argument was not presented to the District Court 
in the first instance, and we therefore deem it waived.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. 
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extreme as to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.  Id. 
at 264–66.  Here, however, Sessoms recounts a single incident in which Colavita 
made unwanted physical contact with Sessoms’s legs.  This incident, while 
inappropriate and unwelcome, was not so egregious as to amount to a “change in 
the terms and conditions of employment.”  Id. at 264; compare Moody v. Atlantic 
City Bd. of Ed., 870 F.3d 206, 215 (3d Cir. 2017).  Accordingly, summary 
judgment was appropriate.7 
III. 
 Finally, Sessoms argues that the District Court acted unreasonably in 
declining to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, claiming that the District Judge’s 
employment as an adjunct professor at Penn’s school of law gives rise to an 
appearance of impropriety.  We review a recusal decision for abuse of discretion.  
Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Recusal is required “in any proceeding in which [the judge’s] impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  Id. at 167 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)).  The standard 
is an objective one; recusal is required only if a reasonable person knowing all the 
circumstances would question the judge’s impartiality.  Id.   
 Here, the District Judge correctly observed that judiciary policy provides 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011). 
7 On appeal, Sessoms has abandoned her claims of disparate treatment due to race, 
gender, and disability discrimination.  We therefore do not consider them. 
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that where, as here, the party to the litigation is the university, but not the 
employing law school itself, “[t]he judge should recuse (or remit) from cases 
involving the university . . . where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned in view of the size and cohesiveness of the university, the degree of 
independence of the law school, the nature of the case, and related factors.”  Guide 
to Judiciary Policy, Compendium of Selected Ethics Advisory Opinions, § 3.4-
3(a).  Considering all of the circumstances, the District Judge observed that 
Sessoms’s case “involves a limited number of individuals in the human resources 
department of an exceptionally large, sprawling health system, which is affiliated 
with a very large educational institution” that includes a law school.  JA 6.  She 
therefore determined that these factors, without more, did not give rise to 
circumstances in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  We agree 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recuse from this 
case. 
IV. 
 For all of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
